

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 03646 01 OF 02 020827Z

15

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

----- 117590

R 020655Z AUG 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1038

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3187

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3646

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF WASHDC, USCINCEUR AND USNMR SHAPE BELGIUM

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR-AUGUST 1 COUNCIL DISCUSSION

SUMMARY. DRAWING ON PREVIOUS GUIDANCE, RUMSFELD PROPOSED AT AUGUST 1 COUNCIL MEETING THAT COUNCIL DIRECT SENIOR POLADS TO BEGIN WORK ON DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. GENERAL REACTION TO U.S. PROPOSAL WAS FAVORABLE AND SUBJECT WILL BE FURTHER DISCUSSED AT AUGUST 3 MEETING. CANADIAN REP CALLED ATTENTION TO DIFFERING U.S. AND UK APPROACHES TO OPENING STAGE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND UK REP AGREED THAT THIS ISSUE WAS IMPORTANT. NETHERLANDS REP POSED QUESTIONS ON U.S. JULY 27 PAPER TO WHICH RUMSFELD RESPONDED. TURKISH REP CIRCULATED TEXT (SEE SEPTTEL) OF COMMENTS ON BELGIAN PROCEDURAL PAPER AND UK STEERING BRIEF. CANADIAN REP CALLED ATTENTION TO NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON PUBLIC USE OF U.S. PAPER. DISCUSSION WILL RESUME AUGUST 3. PER STATE 139940, RUMSFELD ADVISED THAT WE COULD AGREE TO DOWNGRADE U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27 FROM COSMIC TOP SECRET TO NATO SECRET BUT AGAIN STRESSED NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY. END SUMMARY.

1. DRAWING ON EXISTING GUIDANCE AND FOR PURPOSE OF ENCOURAGING ALLIES TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, RUMSFELD OPENED NAC MBFR DISCUSSION AUGUST 1 BY PROPOSING THAT COUNCIL DIRECT SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO BEGIN WORK ON SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03646 01 OF 02 020827Z

DEVELOPING AN ALLIANCE APPROACH TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. RUMSFELD SUGGESTED THAT TOTAL PACKAGE INCLUDE FOUR SECTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) BASIC GUIDELINES

(B) NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

- (C) NEGOTIATING STRATEGY
- (D) INTRA-ALLIANCE COORDINATION

SPC'S FIRST TASK, RUMSFELD URGED, SHOULD BE TO DRAFT A NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. HE CIRCULATED PAPER (TEXT SEPTEL) SETTING FORTH PROPOSED MANDATE FOR SPC.

2. CANADIAN REP (MARSHALL) NOTED THAT COMPARISON OF U.S. AND UK SUBSTANTIVE PAPERS POSED MAJOR ISSUE WHICH ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO SOLVE: U.S. PAPER, HE NOTED, PROPOSED EARLY TABLING OF SPECIFIC ALLIED PROPOSAL, WHEREAS UK PAPER PROPOSED CONCENTRATION DURING INITIAL STAGE ON REACHING AGREEMENT WITH EAST ON AGENDA. MARSHALL AGREED THAT SPC SHOULD BEGIN INTENSIVE WORK PROGRAMS AIMED AT DEVELOPING MBFR NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD HELP IF BASIC DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH BETWEEN U.S. AND UK PAPERS COULD BE RESOLVED BY COUNCIL BEFORE SPC WORK BEGAN. SYG LUNS AGREED THAT SPC NEEDED A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT COUNCIL EXPECTED IT TO DO AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT AGREEMENT ALONG LINES U.S. SUGGESTIONS COULD BE REACHED AT AUGUST 3 MEETING. UK REP (THOMSON) AGREED THAT POINT RAISED BY CANADIAN REP WAS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE AND THAT DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES BETWEEN THE TWO PAPERS SHOULD BE RESOLVED OR AT LEAST DEALT WITH. HE ASKED WHETHER U.S. COULD AGREE THAT SECTION IN ITS PROPOSED MANDATE FOR SPC WORK PROGRAM BE CHANGED FROM "NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL" TO "POSSIBLE NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS AND APPROACHES."

3. RUMSFELD SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE FOR COUNCIL TO DEBATE PRECISE WORKING OF MANDATE FOR SPC. HE POINTED OUT THAT U.S. PROPOSED MANDATE SPOKE IN TERMS OF "NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL" AS A GOAL OF THE SPC WORK AND NOT AS SOMETHING NOW AGREED. SPC WORK, HE SAID, WAS DESIGNED TO BRING ALLIES FROM CURRENT POSITION, WITH NUMBER OF PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE, TO AGREEMENT ON A NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. THOMSON SUGGESTED THAT GOAL MIGHT BE A SERIES OF NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS BUT HE SAID THAT THIS ISSUE COULD BE EASILY RESOLVED BY U.S. AND UK DELEGATIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03646 01 OF 02 020827Z

4. NETHERLANDS REP (BUWALDA) POSED FOLLOWING SIX QUESTIONS, WHICH HE SAID REFLECTED THE HAGUE'S PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF U.S. PAPER OF JULY 27:

(1) DO U.S. AUTHORITIES ENVISAGE ADVANCING PRINCIPLE OF "COMMON CEILING" DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE OR IS THIS CONCEPT ONLY PROPOSED AS AN INTERNAL NATO POSITION? RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT AS STATED PARAGRAPHS 13 AND 14 OF U.S. PAPER, WE PROPOSE TO USE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER SIDE IN FIRST STAGE; WHETHER WE WOULD ASK SOVIETS TO AGREE WITH IT AT THAT STAGE IS A DIFFERENT QUESTION, HE NOTED.

(2) ASSUMING THAT U.S. PROPOSES TO ADVANCE CONCEPT OF OVERALL COMMON CEILING OF 704,000 TO OTHER SIDE AND IF IT IS FURTHERMORE SUGGESTED TO PROPOSE TO THE WARSAW PACT A REDUCTION IN THE FIRST PHASE OF 68,000 SOVIET TROOPS, IT IS REDUCTIONS OF THE REMAINING WARSAW PACT FORCES NECESSARY TO REACH THE PROPOSED CEILING. THIS CALCULATION HAS LED US TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES ARE SUPPOSED TO BE REDUCED BY ABOUT 122,000 OR ABOUT 27.7 PERCENT OF THEIR TOTAL STRENGTH DURING THE SECOND PHASE. ON WESTERN SIDE, ACCORDING TO U.S. FIGURES, REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ONLY 49,000 TROOPS DURING THE SECOND PHASE OR 8.1 PERCENT. THIS PROPOSITION SEEMS TO BE NON-NEGOTIABLE. RUMSFELD RECALLED U.S. PREFERENCE TO AVOIDING DEVELOPING CONTENT OF SECOND STAGE REDUCTIONS AT THIS TIME. HE AGREED THAT THERE WERE MANY OPEN QUESTIONS ON THIS MATTER BUT SUGGESTED IT WAS PREFERABLE NOT TO ATTEMPT TO PIN THEM DOWN NOW.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 03646 02 OF 02 020832Z

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
----- 117619
R 020655Z AUG 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1039
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3188

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 3646
EXDIS

(3) IS IT U.S. INTENTION TO USE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "EQUALITY" MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 14 OF U.S. PAPER TO SUPPORT OUR PROPOSALS FOR A COMMON CEILING? RUMSFELD CONFIRMED THAT WE DID PROPOSE TO USE THIS CONCEPT.

(4) IS IT CORRECT TO INTERPRET PARAGRAPHS 18 AND 19 AS PROPOSING THAT CONSTRAINTS BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA? RUMSFELD CONFIRMED THAT WE PROPOSED THAT CONSTRAINTS ONLY BE APPLIED TO NATO GUIDELINES AREA.

(5) SHOULD FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS BE LIMITED TO U.M. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES, WHY WOULD IT THEN BE REASONABLE AND ADVANTAGEOUS FOR NATO (A) TO APPLY DURING FIRST PHASE THE CONSTRAINTS PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 19 A (2), (3), AND (4); AND (B) TO APPLY THESE CONSTRAINTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL? RUMSFELD SAID WE ENVISAGE APPLICATION OF CONSTRAINTS AS RESULT OF FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT TO U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

(6) SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND PARAGRAPH 19 D TO SAY THAT CON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT IS ENVISAGED ONLY WITH REGARD TO SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY (AND NOT IN OTHER PARTS OF EASTERN EUROPE) AND THAT FOR HUNGARY ONLY NON-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES AND NO OTHER CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE ADVANCED? RUMSFELD NOTED THAT U.S. PAPER DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THIS QUESTION BUT INDICATED THAT U.S. WOULD PRESENT ADDITIONAL IDEAS IN SEVERAL AREAS, INCLUDING THIS ONE.

5. BUWALDA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD U.S. DESIRE NOT GO
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03646 02 OF 02 020832Z

DEEPLY INTO SECOND PHASE AT THIS TIME BUT ASKED IF IT WERE NOT LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT WARSAW PACT STATES WOULD RAISE SOME OF QUESTIONS NOTED ABOVE, IN WHICH CASE ALLIES SHOULD PREPARE TO RESPOND TO THEM. HE SAID HE INTENDED RETURN TO "EQUALITY" CONCEPT AT AUGUST 3 MEETING AND SAID HE ASSUMED THAT U.S. ENVISAGED ONLY NON-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURES FOR HUNGARY.

6. CANADIAN REP OBSERVED THAT ONE OF U. S. PAPER'S MAJOR ATTRACTIONS WAS ITS POTENTIAL PUBLIC APPEAL AND SAID ALLIES SHOULD AGREE ON WHAT COULD BE SAID PUBLICLY ABOUT PAPER. SYG LUNS AGREED THIS WAS IMPORTANT POINT BUT SUGGESTED IT WAS PREMATURE TO BEGIN CONSIDERATION AT PRESENT TIME. RUMSFELD AGREED WITH CANADIAN SUGGESTION THAT ALLIES SHOULD, AT SOME POINT BEFORE OPENING OF NEGOTIATION, DISCUSS PUBLIC POSITION AND DECIDE WHAT COULD BE USED. HE AGREED WITH NEED FOR ACTIVE POLICY PRESENTING ALLIED MBFR POSITION TO PUBLIC AT SOME POINT. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE MARSHALL'S COMMENTS ARE WELL TAKEN AND WE WILL BE MAKING SOME SUGGESTIONS TO WASHINGTON. RUMSFELD

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic DecapTIONing: Z
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 AUG 1973
DecapTION Date: 28 MAY 2004
DecapTION Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO03646
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS, 12-31-81
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730868/abqceblp.tel
Line Count: 202
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <14-Aug-2001 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <21-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR-AUGUST 1 COUNCIL DISCUSSION
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005